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CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Policy in the Commonwealth Caribbean

(DOP(70) 35)

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's paper (the main recommendations of which are summarised at the end of paragraph 11) has been circulated in response to your request for a review of our commitments in the Caribbean. The length of the Annex reflects a situation which, in detail, is complex, although the basic issues are comparatively clear.

2. So far as our political and military commitments are concerned, the position is complicated by the propensity of the Caribbean to erupt into situations in which we are called on to take action which is usually rapid, sometimes unpopular (in terms of world opinion) and often (as in the case of Anguilla) expensive. When these problems occur, they tend to obscure the general picture, which, as indicated in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's paper, is one of progressive disengagement so far as the independent Commonwealth countries are concerned and, as regards the Associated States and dependent territories, consists of a series of embarrassing, inescapable, but essentially small-scale, commitments.

3. Apart from the Anguilla affair (though it is admittedly a large exception) we have latterly been able to discharge our residual political and military commitments in the Commonwealth Caribbean economically as regards both manpower and expenditure. Our physical military presence is already very modest and will soon, on the assumption of a solution to the Anguilla problem, be still further reduced. Assuming the early independence of British Honduras and the Bahamas, we shall then have divested ourselves of the remaining major territories and, therefore, our main political and defence burden in the Caribbean, since we shall no longer have any political or defence commitments as regards the independent Commonwealth countries. We shall still have to reckon with the risk that the residual dependent territories and the Associated States will run into occasional minor internal crises. These, however, are unlikely to lead to serious trouble or embarrassment, provided that we:-

- (a) maintain a minimal naval presence to enable us to defuse potentially dangerous situations; and
- (b) make clear to the Associated States our unwillingness to engage in any more "Anguillas" on their behalf.



4. Within these clear limitations we can help maintain the general stability of the Commonwealth Caribbean, which is of importance to both ourselves and the United States, at a relatively modest military and political cost. To accelerate the present rate of disengagement would probably endanger the stability which we seek to preserve. But the process must continue; and although, as the paper points out, the United States continue to look to us to assure the stability of the area, we should not lose sight of the possibility of inducing them (together with Canada) to take a larger share of responsibility for its affairs.

5. Turning to the economic side, we have a capital investment in the Caribbean, which may be at risk from nationalisation, of at least £250 million. This figure is comparable with our present estimate of British capital investment in India (about £300 million) and would probably be larger if it were possible to include figures for banking, insurance and the oil industry, all of which are, of course, particularly vulnerable to the risk of internal disaffection. And Trinidad is a source of oil which might be very important to us if Middle Eastern supplies were interrupted. The area absorbs  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of our total exports; and, although our share of the market is falling, our exports are increasing. We have a surplus (£27 million) on current account on visible trade; and we earn £20 million per annum on invisibles. As against this, we provide direct aid to the area to the tune of £15 million; and the special arrangements for imports of sugar and bananas cost our balance of payments a further £10 million. Whether, taking into account our direct and indirect expenditure on aid, our economic relations with the area result in a net profit or a net loss is, as always, difficult to say. Probably (although the Ministers concerned would be reluctant to commit themselves on this) we just about break even. But, whatever the balance sheet may show, it is doubtful whether, even if other considerations than purely economic ones were to be disregarded, we should be justified in concluding that our interests would be best served by cutting our losses and pulling out. And, clearly, other considerations are relevant. Our economic interests in the area (if we want to keep them) require stability. So do our (and the Americans') very considerable political and strategic interests. Any sudden and drastic shedding of our commitment would be likely to result in widespread unemployment and unrest; and we would have difficulty in inducing anyone else to take our burden on. In the long term, we should clearly do what we can to reduce the dependence of the area on sugar and bananas by encouraging diversification, even though previous efforts in this direction have not been very successful. A greater degree of self-sufficiency would



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bring nearer the day when the Caribbean territories could support full independence. But greater economic self-sufficiency at the end of the day implies aid now to promote it.

6. If, with our entry into the European Economic Community, it becomes possible to make some arrangement which will enable the Commonwealth Caribbean countries to dispose of a reasonable proportion of their traditional products in their traditional markets and at the same time to diversify their economies, this may lighten our burden. But this is a fairly distant prospect; and for the present it seems unlikely that we shall be able to reduce our direct and indirect aid to any significant extent.

7. In the light of all this, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's recommendations seem to be on the right lines. They are meant primarily as general guidelines which will need to be elaborated in detail; and, if the Committee give them general endorsement, they may wish to invite the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the other Ministers concerned to consider how they may best be implemented in practice.

*Lucy Lind*

27th November, 1970



*on the air*

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*b*



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

31 January, 1972

*New Tom,*

*MS*

Bermuda Talks: The Caribbean

In the course of the recent talks between the Prime Minister and President Nixon in Bermuda the President said he hoped that the British Government would maintain in the Caribbean area an effective presence in both economic and political terms; that he was aware of the problem raised for the Caribbean governments by the United States' reluctance to extend its scheme of generalised preferences for less developed countries to any country which would not agree to phase out its own reverse preferences; but that the Caribbean might be held to be in a different category from, for example, the African countries and that if the British Government judged that reverse preferences were required in the case of the Caribbean, it should be possible to reach agreement on this issue.

We have been considering how the helpful understanding which the Prime Minister reached with Mr. Nixon on this subject can best be followed up. In the course of a separate discussion between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Mr. Rogers in Bermuda, it was agreed that more detailed talks between representatives of the two Governments on problems of mutual concern in the Caribbean should be arranged. The State Department have subsequently proposed that a team should visit London for this purpose in early February, and we have agreed to this. The discussions (in which our side will be headed by Mr. Godber) will provide an opportunity to explore more fully the present American attitude on Caribbean questions in general and on the matters discussed between Mr. Heath and Mr. Nixon in particular; and Sir Alec Douglas-Home proposes to await their outcome before recommending the terms in which the subject can best be pursued, whether by a letter from Mr. Heath to Mr. Nixon or in some other way.

... Meanwhile, you may like to have the enclosed memorandum which explains the lines which it is proposed to follow in the February talks.

*Two over  
Patrick Grattan*

Lord Bridges,  
10 Downing Street.

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any more "Anguillas" on their behalf.



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The Caribbean: Attitude of the United States

The Americans are now reacting to warnings which have been given to them from time to time over the last 18 months by British Ministers and officials that a continued British political and defence presence in the Caribbean is not something that can be taken for granted indefinitely. (c.f. conclusions of DOP (70) 11th meeting). They may assume however that as a matter of policy an early and general withdrawal from our position in the area is in prospect. In fact our purpose has been to bring home to them forcibly that, as we see the situation, the political links binding the Caribbean countries to Britain are certain to become weaker as time goes on, whatever policy we adopt, so that, if the future security of the area is to be preserved, the United States will have to be prepared to accept an increasing degree of responsibility there.

2. The Americans are of course aware that it is HMG's declared policy not to delay independence for any dependencies which want it. They also realise that the Associated States can terminate their association with Britain unilaterally and at any time, provided that certain conditions are met. They are perhaps particularly disturbed at the prospect of early independence for the Bahamas, where they have important defence facilities. On the other hand, they have not perhaps so well understood that it is also HMG's policy not to force independence upon dependencies which do not want it and which may be too small and too poor to stand upon their own feet.

3. The Americans are understandably anxious that a collection of mini-states, perhaps oriented towards Black Power or Communism, should not come into existence in the Caribbean as a result of a British withdrawal, with consequent political instability in the area which could be exploited by Cuba and other opponents of the United States. We can tell them that in the East Caribbean we see little early likelihood of such a state of affairs coming about, although we recognise there is a risk that Grenada may move towards independence shortly and that some others might then follow. We shall have to add that although we should like to see the formation of larger political units in the area, the outlook at present is very unpromising and we can do little if anything to improve it. Our experience has shown that any overt encouragement we may give in that direction is inclined to be counter-productive. We should admit that we find this situation unsatisfactory because associated status has not proved satisfactory in all respects as a solution for the small islands, and we agree with the Americans in disliking the prospect of a proliferation of mini-states.

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(10) MAKE CLEAR

any more "Anguillas" on their behalf.



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4. The Bahamas are to all intents and purposes internally self-governing. Powers which in a normal dependency would be exercised by the Governor are, in the Bahamas, delegated to the local government. HMG's resultant position of responsibility without power has frequently caused embarrassment during the past three years, particularly over finance and immigration matters. The present ruling party is committed to ask for independence if they win a majority in the next election, which is due to take place before March 1973. In that event it would be most unwise for us to attempt to delay independence. Nor would it be in our interests to do so.

5. We can therefore go some way towards allaying the Americans' fear of a possibly proliferation of "Black republics" in the Caribbean proper, but probably not in Grenada or the Bahamas. At the same time we can urge upon the Americans that by agreeing to admit the Caribbean countries to the G.P.S. scheme without regard to reverse preferences given to EEC, they would themselves make a contribution to the stability of the area which they seek.

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(b) make clear ...  
any more "Anguillas" on their behalf.



Ref. A04233

PRIME MINISTER

Grenada

(DOP(73) 40)

The Grenada Constitutional Conference took place (from 14th to 18th May) on the basis proposed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in DOP(73) 36, i.e. that if it appeared that both the Grenada Government and the Opposition were prepared to agree upon a satisfactory constitution and that there was a general consensus that Grenada should move to independence, there might well be advantage in making a quick decision in favour of that course; but that, if it appeared either that the Government and the Opposition were not prepared to agree on a fully satisfactory constitution or that there was such strong opposition to Grenada's becoming independent at this stage as to cast doubt on the wisdom of our granting independence, the delegations would be told that we should have to consider the matter further and that our decision would be conveyed to the Grenadan Delegations after their return to Grenada.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary now reports that substantial agreement was reached between the Government and Opposition delegations on the terms of an acceptable constitution but that at a later stage of the Conference the Opposition said that they could not accept that an agreed constitution should emerge from the Conference and referred to the extensive strikes in Grenada as evidence of popular feeling against early independence. Our decision was therefore reserved; but we undertook to convey our considered view to the two delegations as early as possible.

3. During the Conference Grenada was brought to a standstill by strikes. Among those who passed resolutions against "independence for Grenada by itself alone and the manner in which it is sought" (the words used by Mr. Blaize, the leader of the Opposition Delegation) were a number of Trade Unions, the Chamber of Commerce and the Employers' Federation. 19,000 signatures were obtained in support of a protest. The Deputy British Government representative at St. Vincent was sent to Grenada to make an on the spot assessment (we have no resident representative in Grenada); and this is attached to the memorandum as Annex B. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary notes that there is evidently a considerable minority in Grenada against independence under Mr. Gairy. (Personal antipathies may well play a larger role in this than the reasons quoted by Mr. Blaize.



The Times leading article of 21st May suggested that "the Opposition does not want independence under Mr. Gairy, much as Anguilla repudiated independence under Mr. Bradshaw"). But in the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's view this minority is not large enough to invalidate Mr. Gairy's claim to speak for the majority of the electorate (which numbers 41,000 in total).

4. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary takes the view, which is surely right, that our own interest is that Grenada should proceed to independence. He adds that there are signs that the role of the official Opposition in Grenada may before long be taken over by a newly formed Black Power organisation; and he suggests that it might be better that Mr. Gairy should have a free hand to keep such developments under control in an independent Grenada than that we ourselves should run the risk of becoming involved in the task. He therefore seeks agreement that he should at once inform the Grenada Government and Opposition that we are willing to terminate association by means of an Order in Council; to grant independence; and to amend the existing constitution as necessary.

5. Ministers may wish to consider whether we should take a little longer to assess the situation before making a decision. The official whom we sent to Grenada was a relatively junior officer; he paid his visit at a time of heightened passions; and he appears to have had only about a day in which to make his assessment. The fact is that we know very little about the local situation. There are certainly Black Power elements at work; and there are some of them in the Joint Endeavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation (JEWEL) which has sprung very rapidly into prominence. It is probably true to say that we simply do not know to what extent Black Power is influential in the movement; but it seems premature to assume that it will take over. Even if, as the Grenada Government suggested to our representative, the figure of 19,000 signatures on the petition is open to question, it seems clear that there was very considerable opposition. If we grant independence now, we may be faced with a renewal of trouble, including the possibility of violence (which was not a feature of the strikes last week); and, if that happens, we may be drawn in, whether we like it or not. Moreover, if we make a decision now, the Government may be vulnerable to criticism in Parliament on the ground that the local assessment should have been made by a Minister. In brief, would it not be prudent to reconsider the matter in a few weeks' time, when we might be better placed to judge whether the events of last week were the result of temporary excitement or whether there is substantial and continuing opposition to immediate independence, of a kind which could land us in another Caribbean powder keg if we ignored it.

*David [unclear]*

23rd May, 1973



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Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

23 January, 1974

In your letter of 11 October 1973 you told John Curle that Her Majesty had agreed that She should be represented by Prince Richard of Gloucester, accompanied by Princess Richard, at the celebrations in Grenada which will become independent on 7 February 1974.

As you know the internal situation in Grenada has become tense. There have been violent clashes between anti-Government demonstrators and the police which have involved shooting and consequential casualties including one death.

In these circumstances and in view of the continuing possibility of disorder and violence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary after consultation with his colleagues regrets that he must advise Her Majesty that it would be unwise for TRH Prince and Princess Richard of Gloucester to go to Grenada.

You will remember that a similar situation arose in Mauritius at the time of independence there in 1968. On that occasion the constitutional instruments were handed over to the Prime Minister on Independence Day by the Governor General. Sir Alec Douglas-Home thinks that the same procedure should be followed in Grenada on 7 February.

Certain problems arise over announcing the cancellation of TRH's visit. Sir Alec thinks it right that the Premier, the Hon. E. W. Gairy, should be informed beforehand. We are consulting the British Government Representative in

Castries/

Lt. Col. The Rt. Hon.  
Sir Martin Charteris, KCB, KCVO, OBE,  
Buckingham Palace.

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Castries about this on a contingency basis and I will let you have further advice about an announcement as soon as possible.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Simon Bland, and to Tom Bridges at No. 10.

(A. A. Acland)

PS In case you want a rather fuller account of the situation in Grenada, I enclose a Situation Report which was prepared for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary recently.



## GRENADA

The security situation in Grenada has deteriorated over the last few weeks. The new JEWEL Movement (Joint Endeavour for Welfare Education and Liberation) joined at times by an organisation called "the Committee of 22" consisting of professional and business bodies and the churches, have been behind strikes designed to force the Premier, Mr. Gairy, to resign.

2. On 3 January the Seamen's and Waterfront Workers Union went on strike and since then there have been almost daily demonstrations. On 11 January some members of one of these demonstrations called for the Governor's resignation. She thereupon appealed over the radio for support. This offended the Premier who called for her resignation. She has now resigned.

3. On 20 January the Technical and Allied Workers Union, who control the public utilities, voted to join the strike. Although demonstrations had hitherto been peaceful, there was some violence at a meeting held by the Premier that afternoon. The Premier thereupon recalled the much disliked, and feared, unofficial police aides. On 21 January there were some casualties including the father of one of the leaders of the new JEWEL Movement, who was killed.

4. The Premier has always enjoyed wide support in the countryside outside the capital, but the recent strikes, demonstrations and now



Caribbean

outbreaks of violence have caused attitudes on the Government and opposition sides to harden and has caused the influence of moderates to wane.

5. The Premier is anxious to do all he can to allow independence celebrations on 7 February to be held in reasonably calm circumstances but in the present atmosphere there remains a distinct possibility of increasing disorder and even serious violence which may develop from either an unplanned incident or from the deliberate tactics of the New Jewel Movement. The Premier may succeed in maintaining reasonable public order but he will have to act astutely to avoid any major disturbances during the period leading up to independence.

6. As a precautionary measure, a frigate, HMS Bacchante, is being ordered from Curacao to Trinidad (5 hours steaming from Grenada) to refuel and may be moved nearer to Grenada.

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TO IMMEDIATE CASTRIES TEL NO 45 OF 25 JANUARY / INFO IMMEDIATE  
ST. VINCENT, ROUTINE PORT OF SPAIN.

GRENADA

GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS AS TO THE MOTIVES WHICH ARE INSPIRING  
THE PRESENT WAVE OF UNREST OTHER THAN THE OBVIOUS ONE OF FORCING  
GAIRY OUT OF POWER. IS THE OBJECT TO DELAY INDEPENDENCE AND/OR  
PERHAPS TO GET THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND TROOPS INVOLVED IN  
RESTORING LAW AND ORDER?

2. GRATEFUL ALSO FOR YOUR BEST ESTIMATE OF UK BELONGERS IN  
RESIDENCE AND IN TRANSIT WHO WOULD BE INVOLVED IF IT COMES TO  
EVACUATION. ALSO NUMBER OF OTHERS SUCH AS AMERICANS AND CANADIANS  
WHO MIGHT ALSO NEED TO BE HELPED OUT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES  
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PS/LORD BAINIEL  
MR HANKEY

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E.R.

Ref: BO3980

PRIME MINISTER

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(AA 307)

Grenada: Policy on Intervention by HM Forces  
(DOP(74) 12)

The internal situation in Grenada is bad. We cannot exclude the possibility that the Prime Minister, Mr. Gairy, will lose effective control. Even if he remains in office the country may experience a breakdown of law and order. Unless we have an Act of Parliament revoking the Grenada (Termination of Association) Order 1973, Grenada will become independent on 7th February, whatever the internal situation may be.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary seeks agreement on two points:

- (a) we may have to intervene to evacuate United Kingdom belongers and possibly the Governor;
- (b) we should refuse any request from Mr. Gairy for British forces to aid the civil power to restore and maintain law and order.

But he also notes that if there is a breakdown of Government we will be faced with a very difficult decision whether to intervene, and observes that this is a decision which can be taken only in the light of circumstances at the time.

3. As regards (a) above, we must clearly be in a position to evacuate United Kingdom belongers if they are in danger, whether this danger arises before or after independence. You may wish to seek confirmation that the emergency plans for evacuation are ready. The airfield might not be available and the evacuation would probably have to be carried out by naval vessels. If it happened before independence and the Governor wished to leave we should presumably agree to take him too; but after independence there would be a Governor General, and it may be more questionable whether we should assist him to abandon the country. But what would be our policy about other Grenadians (including perhaps Mr. Gairy or leading members of the opposition) who sought refuge with us? It would be important to be ready with a statement for use in Parliament, and elsewhere, making it clear that the operation was limited to the rescue of United Kingdom belongers and that it was not an intervention in the internal affairs of Grenada. You may wish to ask that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office should have a statement prepared and cleared with you. (This is on the assumption that it is decided that we do not intervene in a more general way.)



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4. As regards (b), the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is surely right in recommending that we should not intervene in response to an appeal from Mr. Gairy to help him remain in power.

5. As regards the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's other point, you may consider that, with independence only a week away, and the possibility that a decision on intervention might have to be taken at very short notice, Ministers should consider now whether there are any circumstances in which intervention should be contemplated, other than to rescue United Kingdom belongers. If we intervened it is difficult to see how we could avoid a return to direct or Colonial rule, or to predict how long this might have to last. It is only too likely that sooner rather than later we would be faced with trouble from both sides in Grenada. There would be some domestic criticism if Grenada fell into chaos and we failed to intervene; but there would be international (and particularly Caribbean) criticism if we were to do so. Ministers may consider that an overriding consideration would be that it could hardly be to our interests to accept the expensive and thankless task of trying to run a country of 100,000 people where the various personal and political internal antagonisms are unlikely to vanish. If that should be the conclusion it would point to taking a firm decision now not to postpone the date of independence (an act which might well commit us in practice to intervention); and not to intervene, no matter how seriously the internal situation worsens.

6. If, however, Ministers consider that we should be prepared to intervene we need to take immediate steps to ensure that we would have sufficient force at our disposal, and the necessary administrative back-up. In this case it would also seem advisable to legislate to postpone independence before going in, and in practice that would probably mean legislating this week or at the very beginning of next week. Intervention after Grenada becomes independent would presumably be out of the question.

Howard Smith

HOWARD SMITH

29th January 1974



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B.F. 7/2/74  
2/1/74

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

1 February 1974

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Mr Sturt

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# GRENADA: POLICY ON INTERVENTION BY HM FORCES

At the meeting of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee on 30 January, Lord Balniel was invited to prepare a statement for use in case HM Forces had to intervene to evacuate "United Kingdom belongers" from Grenada (DOP (74) 4th meeting). I enclose a draft statement which has been approved by the Minister of State, subject to any comments his colleagues may have.

It is hoped that there would be sufficient notice of any deterioration to enable us to advise those British people who wish to leave to do so by commercial transport at an early stage. But we cannot be sure that this will be possible.

It may of course be necessary to amend the statement to take account of the precise circumstances at the time.

Since the situation at which the statement is directed could conceivably arise at any time between now and 7 February when Grenada becomes independent, I should be grateful if any comments could be conveyed as soon as possible and in any event by 6.00 pm on Monday, 4 February.

A J Coles  
Private Secretary to  
Lord Balniel

Private Secretary to  
Secretary of State for Defence  
Ministry of Defence

/copies to:

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S E C R E T

copies to:

Lord Bridges ✓  
Private Secretary to  
Home Secretary  
Private Secretary to  
Lord President of the Council  
Private Secretary to  
Paymaster General  
Private Secretary to  
Attorney General  
Private Secretary to  
Lady Tweedsmuir  
Mr H F T Smith, Cabinet Office

S E C R E T



## S E C R E T

## GRENADA

## Draft Parliamentary statement

I regret to have to inform the House that the security situation in Grenada, which has been a matter of concern for some days, has deteriorated /In the last twenty four hours/ to the extent that members of the British community are in imminent danger.

As Grenada is an Associated State, the Government of Grenada is fully responsible for all internal affairs including law and order, control of the police and the protection of persons in the State. It now appears from reports I/my right honourable Friend have/has received from the British Government Representative that the Government is no longer capable of exercising that responsibility.

/Paragraph on current situation, including assessment of the state of the police, law and order, communications, and the size (at present about 140) and position of the British community./

/In this grave situation we have been in consultation with the Premier, Mr Gairy, who has agreed to our proposed action./

HM Forces have therefore been ordered to Grenada.

/Paragraph on movements of HM ships./

They have been authorised to land Royal Navy and Royal  
/Marine



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Marine personnel as necessary for the strictly limited purpose of protecting and evacuating members of the British community who wish to leave the country. Our forces may also assist similarly /The Governor of Grenada and/ nationals of other countries whose governments have requested our assistance. I must emphasise to the House that the role of our Forces is limited to this task. They have precise orders not to become involved in the general problem of maintaining or restoring law and order in the state; this is the responsibility of the Grenada authorities.

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## TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

## Cabinet / Cabinet Committee Documents

Reference	Date
JIC (A) (70) 13	9.9.70
DOP (70) 35	25.11.70
DOP (70) 11th Meeting, minute 2	30.11.70
DOP (71) 23	15.3.71
JIC (A) (71) (N) 142	4.8.71
DOP (72) 18	18.4.72
DOP (72) 42	17.10.72
DOP (73) 36	10.5.72
DOP (73) 40	22.5.73
DOP (73) 12th Meeting, minute 2	24.5.73
JIC (A) (74) (SA) 5	22.1.74
DOP (74) 3rd Meeting, minute 4	23.1.74
CM (74) 4th Conclusions, minute 3 (extract)	24.1.74
JIC (A) (74) (SA) 9	25.1.74
JIC (A) (74) (SA) 10	28.1.74
DOP (74) 12	28.1.74
JIC (A) (74) (SA) 11	29.1.74
DOP (74) 4th Meeting, minutes	30.1.74
CM (74) 7th Conclusions, minute 2	31.1.74
JIC (A) (74) (SA) 13	1.2.74
JIC (A) (74) (SA) 14	5.2.74
CM (74) 8th Conclusions, minute 7 (extract)	7.2.74
JIC (A) (74) (SA) 23	21.2.74

The documents listed above, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed. Such documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed

R Ponman

R Ponman

Prime Minister's Office Records

Admiralty Arch, The Mall

Date

5 Feb 2004